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Of Sheepdogs and Ventriloquists:
Government Lawyers in Two New Deal Agencies
Daniel R. Ernst
Georgetown University Law Center
“Research on state building in the U.S.,” writes the political scientist Gerald Berk, “usually
holds twentieth-century governance to a single set of standards, namely those of Weberian (or
Prussian) bureaucracy: autonomy, hierarchy, legitimate authority, professionalism, and the
capacity to monitor and control behavior.”1  Typically it emphasizes the United States’
departure from a continental European norm.  European nations bureaucratized before they
democratized, but the United States adopted universal white male suffrage before it created
many centralized, locality penetrating bureaucracies.  When it came to America, bureaucratic
autonomy, the condition in which “a politically differentiated agency takes self-consistent action
that neither politicians nor organized interests prefer, but that they either cannot or will not
overturn or constrain in the future,” rarely proceeded from the top down, through orderly
hierarchies of specialized, full-time officials.  Rather it emerged in the middle of federal
executive departments as bureau chiefs and other “mezzobureaucrats” recruited nonpartisan
staffs, developed state capacity, and cultivated constituencies.2
Scholars of American political development have long recognized that the legal
profession has had an outsized role in building the national state.  Stephen Skowronek, for
example, considered lawyers the “special intellectual cadre” that ran the nineteenth-century state
of courts and parties.  Further, the sociologist Terence Halliday has distinguished two ways in
which lawyers engage in politics, turning on the nature of the authority they assert.  “Technical”
authority arises from the special expertise of the professional.  For lawyers, Halliday mentioned
“skill in understanding statutes, drafting contracts, and executing corporate mergers,” which
lawyers can exercise “without taking an explicit stand on what the law should contain.” 
“Normative” authority relates to “broad issues of public policy concerning which every citizen
should be in a position to come to a decision.”  Lawyers are most authoritative when they invoke
their technical authority, but because lawyers have “technical authority in a normative system,”
they have “an unusual opportunity to exercise moral authority in the name of technical advice”
and “exert enormous influence in great tracts of social life.”3  
When I started in on a book on New Deal lawyers with such literatures in mind, I
1Berk, “The National Recovery Administration Reconsidered,” Studies in American
Political Development 25 (2011): 83.
2Martin Shefter, Political Parties and the State (1994); Daniel Carpenter, The Forging of
Bureaucratic Autonomy (2001).
3Halliday, Beyond Monopoly (1987), 38-41.
expected to find my subjects employing their technical authority to bring the responsible
executive and bureaucratic autonomy to the federal government.  I pictured them as sheepdogs,
nipping at the heels of potentially wayward administrators.  By authoritatively interpreting
statutes, they would help agency heads keep mezzobureaucrats in line.  By requiring that orders
be supported by finding of facts on a record, they would keep officials from wandering into the
arms of businesses and professional politicians.  Sometimes the lawyers behaved just this way,
but even then they followed their own professional and political instincts rather than simply
heeding their master’s voice.
Consider the Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA).  It was created within the
US Department of Agriculture and formally subject to Secretary Henry A. Wallace to establish
marketing agreements and production controls to give farmers the buying power they enjoyed
before the outbreak of World War I.  Its administrator, George Peek, had wanted Wallace’s job
and extracted a promise of direct access to FDR before taking the position.  Wallace’s
undersecretary was Rexford Tugwell, an institutional economist who, with two other Columbia
professors, formed FDR’s “brains trust” during the 1932 campaign.  Jerome Frank, a corporation
lawyer and sojourner among Yale’s legal realists, was formally Peek’s general counsel, but
functionally Wallace’s and Tugwell’s agent within AAA.  Wallace, Tugwell, and Frank shared
Wallace’s apartment in the first days of the New Deal; for a while thereafter, Frank and Tugwell
shared other quarters and were good friends.
Wallace, Frank and Tugwell were all for raising farmers’ income but all against allowing
food processors to pad their profits.  Peek, formerly president of a farm implement company,
was much less solicitous of the consumer, even though the statute directed AAA to “protect the
consumers’ interests” as well as to establish parity prices.  But for the Agricultural Adjustment
Act, the marketing agreements would violate the antitrust laws.  To ensure that they were within
the antitrust exemption, Frank’s legal division, which included Alger Hiss, Louis Jaffe, Lee
Pressman, Frank Shea, and Telford Taylor, carefully reviewed their terms and insisted on access
to the books and records of the food processors.  Peek and his subordinates, recruited from
industry, generally joined in the processors’ resentment of the lawyers’ “captious legal
objections.”4
Early on, Peek complained that the lawyers were assuming a policymaking role invested
in the AAA’s administrators.  Frank replied that the legality of the marketing agreements turned
on the scope of Congress’s delegation in the Agricultural Adjustment Act and, for agreements
beyond it, the reasonableness of their restraint of trade.  To resolve those issues, his lawyers
could not possibly “draw a nice line between policy and law” and “dismiss all questions of
policy as none of our business.”  Peek pushed back hard; Frank, reassured by Tugwell, held his
4Frank, “Dairy Marketing Agreements and Licenses,” July 9, 1934, box 166, ser. 6,
Frank Papers.  Peter Irons provides the fullest account of Frank at AAA and identified
disharmony between chief administrators and general counsels as one of “four major sources of
political conflict” experienced by New Deal lawyers.  The New Deal Lawyers (1982), 10.
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ground until Wallace forced Peek out in December 1933.  For months thereafter, the lawyers
were, as Frank later put it, “riding high and wide” at AAA, confident that in resisting the
administrators they were doing Wallace’s bidding.5  Only when they set their professional
authority against the political might of the Cotton South over the rights of sharecroppers did
Wallace balk and acquiesce in the “purge” of Frank, Pressman, Shea and others.
For a contrast, consider the National Recovery Administration (NRA).  The National
Industrial Recovery Act authorized the president to promulgate codes of fair competition for
individual industries.  As at AAA, an extremely able group of lawyers (including Thomas
Emerson, Milton Katz, and Stanley Surrey) advised administrators overwhelmingly recruited
from business.  Once again, the basis for the lawyers’ claim of authority was statutory: did a
code advance the policies of the statute or did it let industrialists enjoy monopolistic profits?6 
Once again, when lawyers insisted on defining the antitrust exemption, administrators accused
them of exceeding their role.  One, who thought of NRA as “the moderator of the collective
imaginations of American businessmen,” claimed not to see that the agency’s lawyers had raised
“a legal objection” to a code.7 
NRA differed from AAA in at least one important respect.  At AAA, Frank plausibly
claimed to be implementing the policies of Secretary Wallace.  At NRA, a Brookings Institution
study found, “there existed no real policy-making body.”  The Administrator, Hugh S. Johnson,
was a former calvary officer and had overseen the draft during World War I.  He approached
FDR’s charge to NRA “to get many hundreds of thousands of unemployed back on the payroll
by snowfall” as urgently as he had the creation of the American Expeditionary Force.  To put “a
plane of competitive action” beneath the downward spiraling economy, Johnson instructed his
subordinates “to get the codes in” now and deal with abuses if and when they arose. 
Negotiations took the form of “plain horse trading and bare-faced poker playing,” as
administrators agreed to price controls and production limitations in exchange for pledges of
minimum wages, maximum hours, and the observance of the right to organize and bargain
collectively.8 
General Counsel Donald Richberg agreed that industrialists had to be coaxed into code-
5Frank to Frankfurter, December 20, 1935, ibid.; Irons, NDL, 128-32; Frank, Columbia
University Oral History; Frank to Frankfurter, December 20, 1935, ser. 2, box 12, Frank Papers.
6NIRA also forbid codes “designed to promote monopolies or to eliminate or oppress
small enterprises and will not operate to discriminate against them.”
7Dudley Cates to Hugh S. Johnson, August 18, 1933, box 6, entry 20, PI 44, RG 9, NA.
8Leverett S. Lyon et al., The National Recovery Administration (1935), 61, 40 n. 11, 46;
Leverett S. Lyon and Victor Abramson, Government and Economic Life (1940), 1055, 1038-39
n. 6; Colin Gordon, New Deals (1994), 174.
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making. He directed his lawyers to approve even the most dubious on an experimental basis. 
Despite this retreat, lawyers found that administrators, “looking in desperation for some source
of advice detached from any one of the special interests represented in the code bargaining
process,” sometimes turned to them.  On such occasions, their advice went “beyond the issues of
law, far into the realm of general policy.”9  
Conflicting signals from the top allowed lawyers to acquire this authority.  Johnson acted
as “a mere arbitrator among warring groups with their relative strengths determining the final
formulation of policy.”  After his behavior became intolerably erratic, he was forced out in
September 1934.  His replacement, a board representing the conflicting factions, did little better. 
In April 1934, Associate General Counsel Blackwell Smith had been named “assistant
administrator of policy” as well as de facto head of the legal division; he and his lawyers had
won control of policymaking in early 1935, but they never succeeded in imposing their policies
on the code authorities before Schechter rang the curtain down10
At AAA and NRA, lawyers were not or not simply committed to making federal
bureaucracies more closely approximate Weber’s ideal type.  Recall my government-lawyer-as-
sheepdog metaphor.  Sheepdogs reflexively react to their masters’ commands; the New Deal
lawyers displayed rather more agency.  “We young fellows were well aware of the varied crew
that manned the New Deal ship of state and that some of our crusading efforts had to be directed
inwards,” Alger Hiss recalled of his AAA days.  “For example, Peek was out of step with what
we believed was the ‘true” spirit of the New Deal; Wallace and Roosevelt, our leaders and
champions, of course exemplified the ‘true’ spirit.  So Peek’s discomfiture and exit seemed to us
part of the script.”11
Jerome Frank provides an unusually revealing view of one of the New Deal lawyers’
tactics, the projection, in something approaching an act of ventriloquism, of their normative
preferences onto the law, which they then invoked in an assertion of technical authority.  Like
other New Deal lawyers, Frank regularly asserted a technical expertise grounded in positive law. 
Milk licenses, for example, had to “be measured by the yardstick of conformity with the
language of the statute.”12  Unlike other New Dealers, however, he publicly propounded a theory
of law that eroded the distinction between technical and normative expertise.
“Perhaps there is no greater obstacle to effective governmental activity than the
prevalent notion that the ‘law,’ at any given period of time is moderately well known or
9Lyon, NRA, 63-64.
10Lyon and Abramson, GEL, 1040, 1038-39 n. 6; Lyon, NRA, 742.
11Lawrence J. Nelson, King Cotton’s Advocate (1999), 87.
12Frank, “Dairy Marketing Agreements and Licenses.”
4
knowable,” Frank told a national gathering of social workers in June 1933.  Statutes and judicial
opinions were “extremely defective instruments of prediction as to what courts will decide in
particular future cases.”  In fact, judges started “with what they consider a desirable decision and
then work backward to appropriate premises, devising syllogisms” as they went until they
arrived at an aesthetically pleasing justification of “what they think just and right.”13
Frank implied that the technical expertise of lawyers consists in their ability to predict
what a future judge will “think just and right” in a particular case.  The closest I’ve found to an
explanation is Frank’s December 1933 address to the AALS.  In it, he conjured up a
paradigmatic New Deal lawyer, Mr. Try-It.14  One day the young lawyer was asked to determine
whether, under a certain statute, a proposed program for the relief of the destitute would
be lawful.  Mr. Try-it started with his objective.  “This,” he said, “is a desirable result.  It
is all but essential in the existing crisis.  It means raising the standard of living to
thousands.  The administration is for it, and justifiably so.  It is obviously in line with the
general intention of Congress as shown by legislative history.  The statute is ambiguous. 
Let us work out an argument, if possible, so to construe the statute as to validate this
important program.”
Certainly Mr. Try-It employed one form of Halliday’s technical expertise, “skill in
understanding statutes.”  Note, though, that statutory interpretation was the third step in Mr.
Try-It’s analysis.  He started with his own belief that “the relief of the destitute” was “a
desirable result.”  Even verifying that the Roosevelt administration was “for” relief was a
secondary consideration.
Frank did not say why Mr. Try-It’s notion of “a desirable result” was a good predictor of
what a future judge might “think just and right.”  His most likely answer, I think, was that
lawyers trained in “the functional approach” could divine the “immanent rationality in social
life,” which the judge would also heed.15  If this was indeed Frank’s notion of lawyers’ technical
expertise, is it surprising that his adversaries demurred and complained that his “principal
interest in the AAA was undoubtedly policy and not law”?16
If bureaucracies and professions always marched toward modernity in unison, then
13Frank, “Realistic Reflections on ‘Law’ as a Constructive Social Force,” June 16, 1933,
box 166, ser. 6, Frank Papers; Frank to Leon Henderson, July 31, 1939, box 29, entry ww: 172,
RG 266; Frank, “Realism in Jurisprudence,” American Law School Review 11 (1934): 1065.
14Frank, “Realism in Jurisprudence,” 1065.
15Robert W. Gordon, “Historicism in Legal Scholarship,” YLJ 90 (1981): 1028. 
16Leonard D. White, Government Career Service (1935).
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characterizing the lawyers’ contribution to the New Deal as the forging of bureaucratic
autonomy might suffice.  But, like Brian Balogh, I have found that they freely departed from the
Weberian playbook.17  Working within agencies that were more “bundles of rules, cognitive
principles, or instruments” than “order-making machines,” the New Deal lawyers’ goals set
them apart from and sometimes against their administrators.18  Understanding the state they built
and left for us requires seeing them not simply as agents of American political development but
also as self-interested actors in American political history.
17Brian Balogh, “Reorganizing the Organizational Synthesis,” SAPD 5 (1991): 119-72.
18See Gerald Berk, Louis Brandeis and the Making of Regulated Capitalism, 1900-1932
(2009), 15, 16-17.
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